Results

This morning the Court issued a 36 page opinion by Justice Beth Watkins and Judgment in which the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly granted the Council’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Trustees’ claims for trespass to title and also properly granted the Council’s summary judgment on its affirmative claim to quiet title to Camp Fawcett.  The Court determined that the Baker leases did not give up control of Camp Fawcett and are not evidence that the Council ceased to control or manage Camp Fawcett for the benefit of area scouts.  The Court also reviewed the evidence and held that “no reasonable person could conclude that the Council failed to maintain the camp for the benefit of scouts.”  The Affidavit of Fact that the Trustees filed in the real property records was held to be invalid as a matter of law. The only slight negative is that we are still stuck with the Trustees.  The Court ruled that the Council owns Camp Fawcett with a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.  That means that if the Council ceases to use Camp Fawcett as a boy scout camp the Trustees can still seek to reclaim it under the terms of the deed.  If you recall we argued a number of different theories in our summary judgment – including that the Trustee lacked standing and capacity to bring suit, that there was no condition subsequent, that any condition subsequent had not been triggered by the hunting leases, and that the Council had adversely possessed Camp Fawcett.  The trial court had signed an order that did not address which specific theory so on appeal the Council was deemed to have won under all of these theories. In the opinion, the Court of Appeals found that the Trustees did have standing and capacity to being the suit and that there is condition subsequent under the relevant deeds. The Court also disagreed that the Council had adversely possessed the Property.  So to the extent you read the parts in the opinion about “reversed and rendered in part” or that the “trial court erred,” it deals only with those alternate theories.  The trial court also spent a considerable part of the opinion discussing various objections to the Council’s evidence and found that all of the Council’s evidence was properly admitted in evidence. The Trustees have 15 days from today to request a “rehearing” which they may do.  These are typically denied more than 99% of the time.  The Trustees can also skip the rehearing step and file a petition asking the Texas Supreme Court to review the case.  They have 45 days from today to file such a petition.  The Texas Supreme Court only takes cases it wants to take.  Statewide the Supreme Court only grants about 10% of the petitions filed, but that number is closer to 20% for the San Antonio Court of Appeals.  Be prepared for them not to give up and file further appeals, but they are facing an even tougher battle than before.

Learn more about the case here: https://bit.ly/2RueY66

Barbara Barron and Frank Domino prevailed on a traditional motion for summary judgment based on attorney immunity that they filed on behalf of their clients, a law firm and an individual lawyer in Jefferson County, Texas. The motion attacked claims asserted by non-client plaintiffs, arguing that the attorneys’ alleged conduct was within the scope of representation of their client in an underlying lawsuit and was not foreign to the duties of an attorney and therefore protected by attorney immunity. The question presented was whether attorney immunity barred the negligent misrepresentation claims asserted in light of a 2006 Texas Supreme Court decision indicating that non-clients may maintain negligent misrepresentation suits against attorneys despite a lack of privity in limited situations. The court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of our clients and dismissed the related claims.

Cause No. D-203632

MehaffyWeber Shareholder Michael Magee and appellate counsel, Jessica Barger with Wright, Close & Barger, successfully achieved a verdict reversal in a trucking case with The Supreme Court of Texas in a per curiam decision to determine whether an accusation of race and gender prejudice directed at defense counsel over suggesting a smaller amount in damages during closing argument was incurably harmful. The Court ruled in favor of our client, holding that defense counsel was entitled to suggest smaller damages without an uninvited accusation of race and gender bias, and that the resulting harm was incurable by withdrawal or instruction because the argument was designed to turn the jury against defense counsel and his clients.

Shareholder Konor Cormier obtained dismissal of all claims filed by a group of men claiming to be beneficiaries of a trust. On appeal, MehaffyWeber obtained an affirmance of the dismissal and the trial court’s award of the client’s attorney’s fees. Mr. Cormier argued the case to the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio.

San Antonio attorney Uzochukwu Okonkwo successfully prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in a premises liability case. The case involved a slip and fall in a store with a food court, where the Plaintiff alleged he slipped on a puddle of water while walking through the food line. He argued he did not spill the liquid and that the Defendant should have either cleaned it up or warned the Plaintiff due to the time the liquid was on the floor. Uzo’s motion stated that a material question of fact did not exist under either scenario presented. The judge analyzed the issue, determined there was no notice, and granted summary judgment.

Shareholder Maryalyce Cox recently secured a complete defense verdict in a week-long personal injury trial in Harris County. The case involved a furniture company whose delivery men were accused of dropping a sofa on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s attorney requested damages totaling $6.75 million. Following Maryalyce’s arguments, the jury deliberated for just two hours and found the Plaintiff 100% at fault for the incident.